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ABSTRACT
This study demonstrates how constrained efficient allocations can arise endogenously as
equilibria in an economy with a limited ability to enforce contracts and with private agents behaving
competitively, taking a set of taxes as given. The taxes in this economy limit risk-sharing and arise in an
equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments of sovereign nations. The equilibrium allocations
depend on governments choosing to tax both the repayment of international debt and the income from
capital investment in their countries.
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pkehoe@res.mpls.frb.fed.usApplied general equilibrium models have proven useful for analyzing a variety of issues,
ranging from international business cycles to asset pricing. However, many of these models as-
sume the existence of complete asset markets, which in turn implies complete risk-sharing among
agents in the economy. Complete risk-sharing has implications that are often far from the data
(Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland [4]). Researchers have thus developed models in which risk-sharing
is limited for some reason. One approach is to exogenously restrict the set of tradable assets
(Baxter and Crucini [5]); another is to introduce a friction in the environment that endogenously
limits the amount of achievable risk-sharing (Kehoe and Perri [13]).
Recently, we have examined a model in which limited risk-sharing arises endogenously from
the limited ability to enforce credit arrangements between sovereign nations (Kehoe and Perri
[13]). This type of friction goes a long way toward reconciling theory and data. The limited
ability to enforce international credit arrangements manifests itself in enforcement constraints
which require that in each period and state, allocations can be enforced only if their value
is greater than it would be if the country were excluded from all further intertemporal and
interstate trade. This friction captures in a simple way the diﬃculties of enforcing contracts
between sovereign nations that involve large transfers of resources backed only by promises to
repay.
Our recent work focuses on planning problems with enforcement constraints, or constrained
eﬃcient allocations, but does not analyze in detail how these allocations can be decentralized.
Here we do that detailed analysis. We show that constrained eﬃcient allocations arise as equi-
libria of a dynamic game between governments, with private agents acting competitively. In this
game, private agents solve standard competitive equilibrium problems, while the government of
each country can choose to prevent its agents from repaying their outstanding international debts
1by taxing such repayments, and if there is capital, the government can also tax capital income.
We show that the allocations that solve the constrained planning problem can be supported as
equilibria of this game if and only if they satisfy the enforcement constraints.
The main contribution of this work is to show how limited international risk-sharing can
endogenously arise in the equilibrium of an appropriately deﬁned game with competitive private
agents. As such, this work builds on both the literature on international debt–such as the studies
of Eaton and Gersovitz [9], Kletzer and Wright [14], and Manuelli [17] and those surveyed by
Eaton and Fernandez [8]–and the literature on debt-constrained asset markets, particularly the
studies of Alvarez and Jermann [2], Attanasio and Ríos-Rull [3], Kehoe and Levine [11, 12],
Kocherlakota [15], and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall [16].
In those studies, the equilibrium is modeled in one of two ways. In the international
debt literature, private competitive agents are not explicitly modeled; instead, a game is set up
between two large agents, often thought of as the governments of the countries. In the debt-
constrained asset market literature, private agents are explicitly modeled as competitive, but
the constraints that private consumers face are not explicitly chosen by any agent as part of the
equilibrium. For example, in the work of Kehoe and Levine [11], the enforcement constraints are
built directly into the commodity space. Alvarez and Jermann [2] go the farthest and show how
appropriately set constraints on debt can decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations as a
competitive equilibrium. Even in that work, however, the debt constraints are not chosen by
any agent. Alvarez and Jermann [2] show, rather, that if the debt constraints are appropriately
set, then the allocations of interest can be decentralized. Jeske [10] and Wright [19] also analyze
competitive equilibria with limited enforcement, but they focus on the case in which the decision
to repudiate the debt is made by private agents and not by governments, so the strategic element
2of default decision is not explicitly modeled.
Our work goes beyond the literatures on international debt and debt-constrained asset
markets. Here the debt taxes, which are the mechanism through which international risk-sharing
is limited, are derived endogenously as equilibria of a dynamic game between governments.
We begin with a pure exchange economy with two countries and a large number of identical
consumers in each. We set up a planning problem with enforcement constraints and show how
the resulting constrained eﬃcient allocations can be characterized by a transition law for the
ratio of marginal utilities of consumers across countries together with a resource constraint.
We show that the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized as either a competitive
equilibrium with appropriately set debt constraints, as in the work of Alvarez and Jermann [2],
or as a competitive equilibrium with debt taxes. In both notions of competitive equilibrium, the
frictions faced by private agents, the debt constraints or the debt taxes, while appropriately set,
are exogenous.
We then deﬁne a dynamic game in which the governments of the countries optimally choose
the debt taxes as part of the equilibria, while private agents act competitively, taking the debt
taxes as exogenous. We show that any constrained eﬃcient allocation can be supported as
an equilibrium of this dynamic game. In this sense, our economy is a standard competitive
environment in which limited international risk-sharing arises endogenously from the limited
enforcement of international contracts and the strategic interactions between governments.
We then add capital to the model, so that the economy is a standard two-country growth
model with enforcement constraints. We show that the constrained eﬃcient allocations cannot
be decentralized with only the type of debt constraints used by Alvarez and Jermann [2]. This
is because in the planning problem with enforcement constraints, the Euler equation for capital
3accumulation is necessarily distorted away from the ﬁrst-best, but with debt constraints alone,
there is no such distortion. If we add a constraint limiting the amount of capital that can be
saved, as suggested by Seppälä [18], the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized as
competitive equilibria. However, we ﬁnd this decentralization in which consumers are limited in
the amount they can borrow as debt and the amount they can save in the form of capital not
intuitively appealing.
Finally, we show that if the economy includes capital income taxes as well as debt taxes,
then the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized as competitive equilibria. It is
then easy to show that any constrained eﬃcient allocation can be supported as the equilibrium
of a dynamic game in which governments choose both types of taxes.
1. CONSTRAINED EFFICIENT ALLOCATIONS
Consider the following deterministic pure exchange economy, which is a special case of the
stochastic pure exchange economy studied by Alvarez and Jermann [2] and the stochastic pro-
duction economy studied by Kehoe and Perri [13]. We will show here that constrained eﬃcient
allocations in this economy can be decentralized either by limits on borrowing or by taxes on
debt payments to agents outside a country.
1.1. The World Economy
Our theoretical world economy consists of two countries, i =1 ,2, each represented by a large
number of identical, inﬁnitely lived consumers and a time-varying deterministic endowment of a
single homogeneous consumption good. The endowment of country i in time period t is yit while




consumption of the endowment good by consumers in country i in t and β denotes the discount
4factor. The resource constraints are given by
c1t + c2t = y1t + y2t. (1)
We assume that for country i =1 ,2, all endowments yit ∈ [y, ¯ y] for some ﬁnite, strictly positive
constants ¯ y and ¯ y.
This economy has, besides the resource constraints, enforcement constraints which require
that at every point in time, each country prefers the allocation it receives over the allocation it










where Vit denotes the value of autarky for country i from period t on, which is given by the value
of utility in which consumers simply consume their endowment for t on.
The constrained eﬃcient allocations of this economy solve the planning problem of maxi-














subject to the resource constraints (1) and the enforcement constraints (2) for country i =1 ,2
and all periods t, where λ1 and λ2 are nonnegative initial weights on the two countries’ utilities.
An allocation {c1t,c 2t}
∞
t=0 is constrained eﬃcient if it solves the planning problem for some
nonnegative planning weights λ1 and λ2. We characterize these allocations as follows. Let β
tµit
denote the multipliers on the enforcement constraints. Let Mit = Mit−1 + µit and Mi,−1 = λi.
Notice that Mit is the initial planning weight on country i, λi, plus the sum of the multipliers on
5country i’s enforcement constraint from period 0 through period t. By grouping terms, we can















For notational simplicity, we use the normalized weight zt = M2t/M1t and the normalized mul-












where z−1 = λ2/λ1. Thus, constrained eﬃcient allocations are characterized by (4) and (5) along
with the resource constraints and enforcement constraints for some sequence of relative weights
z and multipliers vi. Notice that, if in equilibrium some enforcement constraint is binding, then
the ﬁrst-order condition for relative consumption (5) is distorted away from those conditions for
the unconstrained eﬃcient allocations in which U0(c1t)/U0(c2t)=λ2/λ1, and the allocation will
display less than perfect risk-sharing.
We can get some intuition for how the binding pattern of the enforcement constraints is











6and realize that there are three possible binding patterns for the enforcement constraints: either
country 1’s constraint binds and country 2’s constraint is slack (v1t > 0,v 2t =0 ) , country
2’s constraint binds and country 1’s constraint is slack (v2t > 0,v 1t =0 ) , or both countries’







so that the ratio of country 1’s marginal utility to country 2’s marginal utility increases relative
to this ratio in period t − 1, with the reverse when country 1’s constraint binds. If neither
constraint binds, then the ratio of marginal utilities stays the same. Of course, (7) also implies
that if country 2’s constraint binds, then the consumers in country 1 have the higher intertemporal







with the reverse when country 1’s constraint binds.
This simple manipulation of (7) into (8) gives the intuition for the following lemma estab-
lished by Alvarez and Jermann [2]:

















In words, unconstrained consumers have the highest marginal rate of substitution. Alvarez and
Jermann [2] prove this using a simple variational argument, but for our purposes, the algebra of
7(7) and (8) makes the lemma obvious. We use this lemma when we construct asset prices for the
decentralization with debt constraints. In that decentralization, the asset prices are determined
by the marginal rate of substitution for the unconstrained consumers, which, as this lemma
shows, is whatever marginal rate of substitution is the highest among the consumers.
We will be most interested in allocations for which the present value of the allocation, at
the appropriately deﬁned prices, is ﬁnite for each consumer. Letting q0,t = q0,1q1,2 ...q t−1,t with





we say that an allocation {c1t,c 2t}∞
t=0 has high implied interest rates if for i =1 ,2,
∞ X
t=0
q0,t(y1t + y2t) < ∞. (11)
Here qt,t+1 is the marginal rate of substitution for whichever country’s representative con-
sumer is unconstrained between periods t and t +1 . Typically, in some periods one country’s
consumer will be unconstrained while in other periods the other country’s consumer will be
unconstrained. Thus, the product of these marginal rates q0,t does not represent any single con-
sumer’s marginal rate of substitution between periods 0 and t, but rather is a mixture of both
representative consumers’ marginal rates.
1.2. Decentralization With Debt Constraints
Here we consider how to decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations with debt constraints
along the lines of Alvarez and Jermann [2]. We show that any constrained eﬃcient allocation
that has high implied interest rates can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with
appropriately chosen debt constraints and initial assets.
In this economy, the price of a claim to one unit of the consumption good in period t+1in
period t units is denoted by qt,t+1 and the amount of such asset claims purchased by consumer
8i in period t is denoted by ait+1. In this decentralization, the consumers in country i choose







cit + qt,t+1ait+1 = yit + ait, (13)
ait+1 ≥ Bit+1,
with ai0 given, where Bit+1 ≤ 0 speciﬁes the lowest amount of assets that a consumer in country
i in period t is permitted to have. Thus, {Bit+1} is a sequence of exogenous, time-varying,
country-speciﬁcd e b tc o n s t r a i n t s .
A competitive equilibrium with debt constraints {B1t+1,B 2t+1} together with initial assets
a10 and a20 is a set of allocations {c1t,c 2t}, asset holdings {a1t+1,a 2t+1}, and asset prices {qt,t+1}
for which {cit,a it+1} solves (12) for each i, and markets clear, so that a1t+1 + a2t+1 =0and (1)
holds.
Let β














0(cit)(ait − Bit)=0 . (15)
Hence, the allocations and prices that constitute a competitive equilibrium are summarized by
the resource constraints (1), the budget constraints (13), the ﬁrst-order conditions (14) with
θit ≥ 0, and the transversality conditions (15).
9Given a constrained eﬃcient allocation {c1t,c 2t} with normalized multipliers {v1t,v 2t}, we
construct the asset prices, asset holdings, and debt constraints that decentralize this allocation
as follows. Let






be the asset price, and given this price and the allocations, use (14) to deﬁne the multipliers θit.
It is immediate that these multipliers have the right properties. If consumer i has the higher
marginal rate of substitution, so that qt,t+1 = βU0(cit+1)/U0(cit), then θit =0 . If consumer i has
the lower marginal rate of substitution, U0(cit+1)/U0(cit) <U 0(cjt+1)/U0(cjt), then (14) and (16)
imply that θit > 0.
Using the transversality condition, we can iterate on the consumer budget constraints to




qt,s(cis − yis), (17)
where qt,s = qt,t+1qt+1,t+2 ...q s−1,s. We set initial assets ai0 =
P∞
t=0 q0,t(cit − yit).
We set the debt constraints as follows. If a debt constraint binds for consumer i in t, so
that vit+1 > 0, then we set the debt constraint Bit+1 = ait+1, so that the constrained consumer
can borrow no more than the consumer’s actual borrowing.
I fad e b tc o n s t r a i n ti ss l a c kf o rc o n s u m e ri in t,s ot h a tvit =0 , then there are many ways
to set the borrowing limit, all of which will be slack. The loosest is to set the limit equal to the
present discounted value of future endowments, so that Bit+1 = −
P∞
s=t+1 qt+1,syis. Alvarez and
Jermann [2] choose to set it according to the following counterfactual thought experiment. If
at the constructed prices an unconstrained consumer happens to borrow exactly up to the limit
in period t and then acts optimally from then on, this consumer will be indiﬀerent between the
10proposed allocations and autarky. More formally, let Jit(ait) denote the maximized value in the
consumer’s problem (12) for some arbitrary level of initial assets, where we have suppressed the
dependence of this value on the current and future prices and debt constraints {qs,s+1,B is+1}∞
s=t.
Then deﬁne debt constraints to be not too tight if the sequence {Bit+1} satisﬁes
Jit(Bit)=Vit. (18)
Notice that (18) not only deﬁnes the debt constraints for the unconstrained consumer as we
have discussed, but applied to the constrained consumer, it also automatically implies that
Bit+1 = ait+1.
To make our argument complete, we need to show that any constrained eﬃcient allocation
that satisﬁes the high implied interest rate condition (11) also satisﬁes the transversality condition
(15). To see this, note that with debt constraints that satisfy Bit+1 = −
P∞
s=t+1 qt+1,syis for the
unconstrained consumer and Bit+1 = ait+1 for the constrained consumer, from (17) it follows
that ait − Bit is equal to
P∞
s=t qt,scis for the unconstrained consumer and equal to 0 for the
constrained consumer. In either case, since cis is nonnegative and satisﬁes the resource constraint,
ait − Bit ≤
P∞

















q0,s(y1s + y2s)=0 ,
where the second inequality in (19) follows since, by construction, q0,t ≥ β
tU0(cit)/U0(ci0), and
the second equality in (19) follows from the high implied interest rate condition (11).
From the construction, it is immediate that the constrained eﬃcient allocations {c1t,c 2t}
together with the constructed asset positions {a1t,a 2t}, debt prices {qt,t+1}, and debt constraints
11{B1t+1,B 2t+1} form a competitive equilibrium with debt constraints. We have thus established
the following:
Proposition 1. Any constrained eﬃcient allocation that has high implied interest rates can
be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with debt constraints.
1.3. Decentralization With Debt Taxes
Now we discuss how to decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations as a competitive equi-
librium with debt taxes. We show that if these debt taxes are appropriately chosen, then the
constrained eﬃcient allocations can be decentralized. (In the next section, we will allow the
governments to purposefully choose these taxes.)
In this economy, the government of each country can tax payments made to consumers in
the other country and then rebate the proceeds in a lump-sum fashion to its own consumers.
Except for these government policies, private markets function perfectly.
We begin by setting up a competitive equilibrium with debt taxes. Consider the consumer
problem and the government budget constraint for some arbitrarily given sequence of govern-
ment policies and prices. Throughout we will focus on country 1; the notation for country 2
is analogous. It is convenient to deﬁne separate variables for saving and for borrowing. We let
s1t+1 ≥ 0 denote the savings, or assets, of a consumer in country 1, b1t+1 ≥ 0 denote that con-
sumer’s borrowings, or liabilities, and τ1t ∈ [0,1] denote the tax rate levied by the government
of country 1 on payments from country 1 consumers to country 2 consumers.





12subject to the budget constraint
c1t + pt,t+1(s1t+1 − b1t+1)=y1t +( 1− τ2t)s1t − b1t + T1t; (20)
the nonnegativity constraints sit+1,b it+1 ≥ 0; and bounds on debt b1t+1 ≤ ¯ b, where ¯ b is a large
positive constant. Here pt,t+1 is the price of a consumption good in t+1in period t units, τ2t is
country 2’s tax rate on payments s1t that country 2 consumers make to country 1 consumers, and
T1t is lump-sum transfers from the government of country 1 to its own consumers. The initial
assets si0 and liabilities bi0 are given.
The government of country 1 c h o o s e sat a xr a t eo np a y m e n t st oc o u n t r y2c o n s u m e r sτ1t
and rebates the revenues to its own consumers in a lump-sum fashion, so that the government
b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ti nc o u n t r y1 is T1t = τ1tb1t.
A competitive equilibrium with debt taxes {τ1t,τ2t}
∞
t=0 together with initial assets and




t=0, and prices {pt,t+1}∞
t=0 such that {cit,s it+1,b it+1} solves the consumer problem for
each i, and markets clear, so that s1t+1 = b2t+1 and b1t+1 = s2t+1 and the resource constraint (1)
holds.
To understand the budget constraints of the consumer and the government, suppose that in
period t−1 a consumer in country 1 lends pt−1,ts1t in exchange for a promise to receive, in period
t,s1t minus the taxes τ2ts1t levied by country 2 on repayments to country 1. Consumers in country
2 repay a total of s1t = b2t, with (1 − τ2t)s1t going to country 1 consumers and τ2ts1t = τ2tb2t
going to the government of country 2. The government of country 2 then redistributes its tax
revenue in a lump-sum fashion to its own consumers.
For brevity, from now on we let U0
it denote Uct(cit). With this notation, the ﬁrst-order





1t+1(1 − τ2t+1), (21)






with equality if b1t+1 > 0, so that country 2 is lending to country 1. Here and throughout we






1t(sit+1 − bit+1 +¯ b)=0 . (23)
We now show the following analog of Proposition 1.
Proposition 2. Any constrained eﬃcient allocation that has high implied interest rates can
be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with debt taxes.
Proof. We decentralize a constrained eﬃcient allocation with high implied interest rates as
f o l l o w s .W es e tt h ep r i c e s











2t, then we set
τ1t+1 =0and












2t, then we set τ2t+1 =0and








14Notice, for later, that the constructed tax rates lie between 0 and 1 and that








For assets and liabilities, we set









qt+1,s(yis − cis) (28)
with qt,s = qt,t+1qt+1,t+2 ...q s−1,s and qt,t+1 = β maxi U0
it+1/U0
it. If the right side of (28) is nonneg-
ative, we set bit+1 =0 ;if the right side of (28) is negative, we set sit+1 =0 .
We can see that the constructed prices, taxes, and assets and liabilities are a competitive
equilibrium with taxes as follows. To check the constructed prices, notice that in equilibrium in
























(1 − τ1t+1), (30)














When either (29) or (30) hold, it is clear that the price pt,t+1 satisﬁes (24), while if (31) holds,
the price pt,t+1 can take on a range of values, one of which is given by (24). By inspection, we
know that the constructed taxes satisfy (29)—(31).
To check the constructed assets and liabilities, substitute the budget constraint of the
government T1t = τ2tb1t into that of the consumer to obtain
c1t + pt,t+1(s1t+1 − b1t+1)=( 1− τ1t)s1t − (1 − τ2t)b1t + y1t, (32)
15where if s1t > 0 and b1t =0 , then (1 − τ1t)(1 − τ2t)=( 1− τ1t); and if s1t =0and b1t ≥ 0, then
(1 − τ1t)(1 − τ2t)=( 1− τ2t). Hence, in general, we can write (32) as
c1t + pt,t+1(s1t+1 − b1t+1)=( 1− τ1t)(1 − τ2t)(s1t − b1t)+y1t. (33)
Using the transversality condition, we can iterate on (33) to obtain
s1t+1 − b1t+1 =
1
(1 − τ1t+1)(1 − τ2t+1)
∞ X
s=t+1
ρt+1,s(y1s − c1s), (34)
where ρt,s = ρt,tρt,t+1 ...ρs−1,s and ρt,t =1and
ρt,t+1 =
pt,t+1
(1 − τ1t)(1 − τ2t)
.
Using (24) and (27), we can see that ρt,t+1 = qt,t+1 and, hence, that ρt,s = qt,s. This relation used
along with (27) in (34) lets us reduce (34) to (28).
The ﬁnal step is to show that at the constructed allocations, if the high implied interest





1t =0 . (35)
To see this, note that since pt,t+1 satisﬁes (24), pt,t+1U0
1t ≤ U0
1t+1, while the high implied interest




















1t =0 . Since pt,t+1 satisﬁes (24), pt,t+1U0
1t ≤ U0
1t+1, and hence, (35) holds. Thus,
we need only show that limt→∞ β
tpt,t+1U0





















































q0,s(y1s + y2s)=0 , (39)
where (36) follows from (24) and (28), (37) from the deﬁnition of qt,t+1, (38) from the deﬁnition
of q0,s, and the inequality in (39) from the resource constraint, while the equality follows from
(11). ¥
1.4. Diﬀerences
Although we have shown that either debt constraints or debt taxes can be used to decentralize
an allocation, there is an important diﬀerence in how interest rates and prices are deﬁned in
the two decentralizations. In the debt constraints economy, the interest rate (1/qt,t+1) is given
by the marginal rate of substitution of the agent whose enforcement constraint is not binding,
while in the economy with debt taxes, the interest rate (1/pt,t+1) is given by the marginal rate
of substitution of the agent whose enforcement constraint is binding. So, in general, the decen-
tralization with debt taxes will produce higher interest rates than the decentralization with debt
constraints. At an intuitive level, we know that in the decentralization with debt constraints,
interest rates are low, and the debt constraint is needed to prevent the agent with the binding
enforcement constraint from borrowing “too much.” Conversely, in the decentralization with
debt taxes, interest rate are high, and taxes are needed to prevent the agent whose enforcement
constraint is not binding from saving “too much.”
17One implication of these diﬀerent decentralizations is how interest rates respond to enforce-
ment frictions. If we start from a frictionless economy and add enforcement problems, then we
see that the interest rate moves diﬀerently in the two decentralizations. Relative to the friction-
less rate, the interest rate falls in the debt constraint decentralization and rises in the debt tax
decentralization. We ﬁnd this feature of the debt tax decentralization somewhat appealing.
2. ENDOGENIZING THE DEBT TAXES
In our decentralizations, we have used the constrained eﬃcient allocations to construct the ap-
propriate debt constraints or debt taxes that decentralize the given allocations, but we have not
oﬀered a story about where these constraints or taxes come from. Here we provide a story for
how the constructed debt taxes may come out of an equilibrium of a dynamic game with both
government behavior and consumer behavior endogenous.
2.1. The Dynamic Game
We set up this dynamic game as follows. In each period, the governments and the consumers
can vary their decisions, depending on the history of government policies up to the time the
decision is made. We let πt =( τ1t,τ2t) denote the two governments’ policies in period t. At the
beginning of period t, the government of each country chooses a current policy as a function of
the history of past government policies ht−1 =( π0,...,πt−1) together with a contingency plan for
setting future policies for all possible future histories. Let σit(ht−1) denote the period t tax on
debt repayments chosen by the government of country i when faced with history ht−1. After the
government sets the current policies, consumers make their decisions. Faced with the history
ht =( ht−1,πt), consumers in country i choose their period t consumption, assets, and liabilities,
denoted fit(ht)=(cit(ht), sit(hit),b it(ht)). The prices are a function of the government policy
18history and are denoted pt,t+1(ht). Let σ =( σ1,σ2), and let σi denote the inﬁnite sequence of
functions (σit). Use similar notation for the other variables.
For some given initial assets and liabilities, a sustainable equilibrium is a triple (σ,f,p)
such that three conditions are satisﬁed:
(i)F o ri =1 ,2, for every history of government policies ht, the consumer allocations fis(hs)







c1s + ps,s+1(hs)(s1s+1 − b1s+1)
= y1s +[ 1− τ2s(hs−1)s1s(hs−1)] − b1s(hs−1)+T1s(hs−1),
where the future histories’ policies and prices are induced from ht, σ, and p in the obvious way.
That is, ht+1 = (ht,σt+1(ht)), ht+2 = (ht,σt+1(ht),σt+2(ht,σt+1(ht))), and given these induced
future histories, the policies and prices are given by σs(hs−1) and ps(hs).
(ii) For every history ht, markets clear and the government budget constraint holds for
s = t,..., so that c1s(hs)+c2s(hs)=y1s + y2s, as well as s1s(hs)=b2s(hs),s 2s(hs)=b1s(hs), and
T1s(hs−1) ≡ τ1s(hs−1)b1s(hs−1), where the future histories hs are induced from σ in the obvious
way.





















2t+1(ht))) and so on. A
similar condition holds for the government of country 2.
Notice that in this deﬁnition of a sustainable equilibrium we require that both the gov-
ernments and the consumers act optimally for every history of policies–even for histories not
induced by the governments’ policy plans. This requirement is analogous to the requirement
of perfection in a game. In this deﬁnition, the consumers act competitively in that they take
current policies and prices and the evolution of future histories as unaﬀected by their actions.
The governments are not competitive. The government of country 1, for example, takes the allo-
cation rules f1 and f2, the price function p, a n dt h ep o l i c yp l a no ft h eg o v e r n m e n to fc o u n t r y2,
σ2, as given. But the government of country 1 realizes that it can aﬀect outcomes both directly,
by having its consumers face a diﬀerent tax on payments to the other country’s consumers, and
i n d i r e c t l y ,b ya ﬀecting the evolution of the future history and thus aﬀecting the policies chosen
by the other government, the allocations chosen by the consumers, and the prices.
2.2. Outcomes of a Sustainable Equilibrium
Recall that a sustainable equilibrium (σ,f,p) is a sequence of functions that specify policies,
allocations, and prices for all possible government policy histories. Thus, when we start from
the null history in period 0, a sustainable equilibrium induces a particular sequence of policies,
allocations, and prices that we denote by (π,x,p). We call this the outcome induced by the
sustainable equilibrium. In what follows, we adapt the work of Chari and Kehoe [6, 7], which
builds on the work of Abreu [1], to characterize this outcome.
We ﬁrst construct a sustainable equilibrium that we call the autarky equilibrium. We then
characterize the allocations that can be induced by reverting to this autarky equilibrium after
20deviations. We deﬁne the autarky policy plans σa, allocation rules fa, and price rules pa starting
from some given initial assets and liabilities as follows. The policy plan σa
it(ht−1)=1 , for all
i and t. Given any history ht, the autarky allocations (ca
it(ht),s a
it+1(ht),b a
it+1(ht)) are given by
ca
it(ht)=yit, while the autarky prices of debt and the quantities of assets and liabilities are
identically zero, so pa
t,t+1(ht)=sa
it+1(ht)=ba
it+1(ht)=0 . The utility of autarky for consumer i in
period t is Vit.
We now characterize the outcomes that can be sustained by a set of plans called the revert-
to-autarky plans, which are deﬁned as follows. For an arbitrary sequence of policies, allocations,
and prices (π,x,p), these plans specify continuation with the candidate sequences (π,x,p) as
long as the speciﬁed policies have been chosen in the past; otherwise, the plans specify the
revert-to-autarky plans (σa,fa,p a). We then have
Proposition 3. An arbitrary triple of sequences (π,x,p) can be sustained by the revert-to-
autarky plans if and only if the sequence is a competitive equilibrium with debt taxes and if, for




s−tU(cis) ≥ Vit. (40)
Proof. Suppose, ﬁrst, that the sequences of policies, allocations, and prices (π,x,p) can be
sustained by the revert-to-autarky plans; that is, suppose the associated revert-to-autarky plans
(σ,f,p) constitute a sustainable equilibrium. From the deﬁnition of a sustainable equilibrium,
consumer optimality requires that x maximize consumer welfare in period 0. This requirement
together with market-clearing ensures that this sequence is a competitive equilibrium in period
0.
21Next, we claim that inequality (40) holds for all i and t. Note that a feasible policy for
the government of i in t is to choose the autarky policies for all s ≥ t by taxing repayments to
consumers in the other country at rate 1. This policy will lead to a continuation utility of V a
it,
and hence, optimality of government policy ensures that (40) holds.
Now suppose that some arbitrary triple of sequences (π,x,p) satisﬁes the proposition’s
conditions. We show that the associated revert-to-autarky plans constitute a sustainable equi-
librium. Consider, ﬁrst, histories for which there have been no deviations from π before t. Since
(π,x,p) is a competitive equilibrium in period 0,xis optimal for consumers in period 0 given
π and p, and thus, the continuation of x is optimal for consumers when they are faced with
the continuation of π and p. In terms of government optimality, consider the situation of the
government of country 1. If it deviates in period t, then the consumers in both countries and the
government of country 2 will revert to the autarky policy plans and the autarky allocation rules
from period t on. Under these allocation rules, country 2 consumers will never lend to country 1
consumers, regardless of the policies chosen by the government of country 1. Thus, the best the
government of country 1 can obtain is the value of autarky from then on given by the right side
of (40). Given the assumed inequality, then, sticking to the speciﬁed plan is optimal.
Consider, next, histories with a deviation from π before t. Clearly, the autarky plans from
then on are sustainable. From a consumer’s point of view, since no debt will be repaid, lending
is not optimal. The price of debt is zero since the value to a potential lender in the other country
of a promise to pay one unit tomorrow, net of taxes equal to one unit, is worthless. Thus, the
consumer is indiﬀerent among all amounts to borrow or lend because all have value 0 and all
pay 0. From a government’s point of view, given that the other government never allows its
consumers to repay their debts outside the country, regardless of the ﬁrst government’s actions,
22it is optimal to prevent its own consumers from repaying their debts outside the country. ¥
Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we immediately obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Any constrained eﬃcient allocation is the outcome of a sustainable equilib-
rium.
3. ADDING CAPITAL
We now explore how our results change when we move from a pure exchange economy to a growth
model with capital. We ﬁrst show in a constrained eﬃcient allocation that if the enforcement
constraints bind, then the Euler equation for capital is distorted. This result implies that a
competitive equilibrium with debt constraints alone cannot decentralize such an allocation. But
if in addition to the debt constraints, we allow for constraints that limit the amount of capital
that can be accumulated, capital constraints, then the constrained eﬃcient allocations can be
decentralized. However, we argue that such capital constraints are not intuitively appealing and
turn to our preferred decentralization: a combination of debt taxes and capital income taxes.
This combination can decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations. Finally, we sketch out
how these taxes may endogenously arise in a dynamic game similar to that just described.
3.1. A Growth Model
We modify our pure exchange economy in several ways. The preferences are the same as before.
The resource constraints are now
c1t + c2t + k1t+1 + k2t+1 = A1tf(k1t)+A2tf(k2t)+( 1− δ)(k1t + k2t) (41)
with ki0 given, where kit+1 is the capital stock chosen in period t for use in production in
period t+1;f(k) is a standard production function that is increasing, concave, and continuously
23diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes the standard Inada conditions; Ait is country-speciﬁcd e t e r m i n i s t i c












cit + kit+1 = Aitf(kit)+( 1− δ)kit. (44)
Notice that the problem with (ﬁnancial) autarky reduces to that of a planning problem of a
closed-economy growth model. Notice also that the value of utility under autarky in period t
depends on the amount of capital located in country i in that period, kit. The derivatives of this
value, V 0(kit), will be the root problem behind why the equilibrium with debt constraints alone
cannot decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations.
The constrained eﬃcient allocations of this economy solve the planning problem of maxi-














subject to the resource constraints (41) and the enforcement constraints (42) for country i =1 ,2
and all periods t, where λ1 and λ2 are nonnegative initial weights on the two countries’ utilities.
An allocation {c1t,c 2t,k 1t+1,k 2t+1}
∞
t=0 is constrained eﬃcient if it solves the planning prob-
lem for some nonnegative weights λ1 and λ2. Let β
tµit denote the multiplier on the enforcement




























Rewriting these using zt = M2t/M1t and vit = µit/Mit gives that the transition law for the z













where z−1 = λ2/λ1. Equation (46) is the Euler equation for capital accumulation in the economy
with enforcement constraints. This equation is distorted away from the familiar Euler equation




Notice that if vit+1 were equal to zero, then (46) would reduce to (47).
3.2. Decentralization With Debt Constraints
We now show that a competitive equilibrium with debt constraints alone cannot decentralize the
constrained eﬃcient allocations, except for the trivial case in which the enforcement constraints
never bind. In general, to decentralize such allocations, we need constraints limiting the amount
of capital that can be saved on capital as well as constraints limiting the amount of borrowing
with debt.
25Consider an economy with two countries i =1 ,2, each of which has a representative con-
sumer. Each consumer owns a production unit. Only that consumer can work with that unit,
but the consumer can borrow and lend from anyone else, subject to some time-varying debt







cit + qt,t+1ait+1 + kit+1 = f(kit)+( 1− δ)kit + ait (49)
ait+1 ≥ Bit+1, (50)
where Bit+1 is an exogenous, time-varying, agent-speciﬁc debt constraint. (We can imagine that
kit ≥ 0, but when f satisﬁes the Inada conditions, this will never bind, so we ignore it.) Letting
β











0(kit+1)+( 1− δ)] (51)
with θt ≥ 0.
Proposition 5. If the enforcement constraint ever binds in the constrained eﬃcient alloca-
tion, then that allocation cannot be decentralized as an equilibrium with debt constraints.
26Proof. By construction, the normalized multiplier vit+1 ∈ [0,1]. Suppose, by way of contra-
diction, that the enforcement constraint binds in some period t, so that vit+1 is strictly positive.













is strictly larger than the right side of (51). Thus if (46) holds at the constrained eﬃcient
allocation, then the Euler equation in the decentralized equilibrium (51) cannot also hold. ¥
Now imagine that besides the debt constraint, we also add a capital constraint, a time-
varying constraint on the amount of capital that can be saved of the form
kit+1 ≤ Dit+1, (52)
where {Dit+1} is a sequence of constants. It should be fairly obvious that if we choose these
constants appropriately, then we can decentralize the constrained eﬃcient allocations.
To see this, imagine adding (52) to the consumer’s problem (48). If we let β
tλit denote the




0(kit+1)+( 1− δ)] − λit. (53)
With the appropriate choice of the capital constraint, the multiplier λit can be set so that
(53) coincides with (46). (For an alternative approach that arrives at the same conclusion, see
Seppälä [19].)
3.3. Decentralization With Taxes
Consider now decentralizing the constrained eﬃcient outcome as a competitive equilibrium with
taxes on capital income as well as on debt. With these two taxes, we can mimic the distorted
ﬁrst-order conditions that deﬁne the constrained eﬃcient outcome.






subject to the budget constraint
c1t + pt,t+1(s1t+1 − b1t+1)+kit+1 = w1t +( 1− τ2t)s1t − b1t + Ritkit + T1t (54)
and the nonnegativity constraints sit+1,b it+1 ≥ 0, and si0,b i0 and ki0 given. Here Rit =1+
(1 − ηit)(rit − δ) is the gross return on capital after taxes and depreciation, rit is the before-
t a xr e t u r no nc a p i t a l ,a n dηit is the tax on capital income net of depreciation (rit − δ). In this
decentralization, there are ﬁrms whose behavior we can summarize by conditions for rental rates
and wage rates:
rit = f
0(kit) and wit = f(kit) − kitf
0(kit). (55)
In this economy, a competitive equilibrium with debt and capital income taxes
{τ1t,τ2t,η1t,η2t}
∞
t=0 together with initial assets, liabilities, and capital stocks {si0,b i0,k i0}i=1,2




t=0, and prices {pt,t+1,r it,w it}∞
t=0 such that {cit,s it+1,b it+1,k it+1} solves the consumer
problem for each i and markets clear, so that s1t+1 = b2t+1 and b1t+1 = s2t+1 and the resource
constraint (41) holds.
The construction of the debt taxes, assets, liabilities, and prices is nearly identical to that
for the pure exchange economy. The rental rates r and wage rates w are given by (55) while the
tax on capital income η is backed out from the Euler equation
U
0(cit)=βU
0(cit+1)[1 + (1 − ηit+1)(fkit − δ)].
28The following proposition is then immediate:
Proposition 6. Any allocation that satisﬁes the resource constraint and has high implied
interest rates can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with debt and capital income
taxes.
It is straightforward to show that any constrained eﬃcient outcome is the outcome of a
suitably deﬁned sustainable equilibrium.
4. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a new decentralization of constrained eﬃcient allocations in which the forces
that give rise to the limited risk-sharing are more explicitly modeled than in the existing liter-
ature. The decentralization is intuitively appealing when applied to international risk-sharing
problems for economies with capital and a limited ability to enforce contracts. It may be possi-
ble to similarly model the forces that limit risk-sharing in other decentralizations, for example,
an equilibrium in which the debt constraints studied by Alvarez and Jermann [2] are explicitly
chosen by ﬁnancial intermediaries in an appropriately deﬁned dynamic game.
Here we have focused on a deterministic economy in order to economize on notation, but
all our results immediately generalize to a stochastic economy, provided that debt constraints,
capital constraints, and taxes can be state-contingent.
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